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1 Introduction
In response to recent corporate governance scandals, governments have responded by adopted
a number of regulatory changes. One component of these changes has been increased dis-
closure requirements. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley (sox), adopted in response to Enron,
Worldcom, and other public governance failures, required detailed reporting of oﬀ-balance
sheet ﬁnancing and special purpose entities. Additionally, sox increased the penalties to
executives for misreporting. The link between governance and transparency is clear in the
public’s (and regulators’) perceptions; transparency was increased for the purpose of im-
proving governance.
Yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing to do with corporate
governance. The most commonly discussed beneﬁt of transparency is that it reduces asym-
metric information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the ﬁrm’s securities and the ﬁrm’s
cost of capital.1 To oﬀset this beneﬁt, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of
disclosure, as well as the competitive costs arising because the disclosure provides potentially
useful information to product-market rivals.2 While both of these factors are undoubtedly
important considerations in ﬁrms’ disclosure decisions, they are not particularly related to
corporate governance.
In this paper, we provide a framework for understanding the role of transparency in
corporate governance. We analyze the eﬀect that disclosure has on the contractual and
monitoring relationship between the board and the ceo. We view the quality of information
the ﬁrm discloses as a choice variable that aﬀects the contracts the ﬁrm and its managers.
Through its impact on corporate governance, higher quality disclosure both provides bene-
ﬁts and imposes costs. The beneﬁts reﬂect the fact that more accurate information about
performance allows boards to make better personnel decisions about their executives. The
costs arise because executives have to be compensated for the increased risk to their careers
implicit in higher disclosure levels, as well as for the incremental costs they incur trying to
distort information in equilibrium. These costs and beneﬁts complement existing explana-
tions for disclosure. Moreover, because they are directly about corporate governance, they
are in line with common perceptions of why ﬁrms disclose information.
We formalize this idea through an extension of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Herma-
lin’s (2005) adaptation of Holmstrom’s (1999) career-concerns model to consider the question
1Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) were the ﬁrst to formalize this idea. For empirical evidence, see Leuz
and Verrecchia (2000), who document that ﬁrms’ cost of capital decreases when they voluntarily increase
transparency.
2See Leuz and Wysocki (2006) for a recent survey of the disclosure literature. Feltham et al. (1992), Hayes
and Lundholm (1996), and Wagenhofer (1990) provide discussions of the impact of information disclosure
on product-market competition.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 2
of optimal transparency. Section 2 lays out the basics of this model, in which the company
chooses the “quality” of the performance measure that directors use to assess the ceo’s
ability. In this model, the optimal quality of information for the ﬁrm to reveal can be zero,
inﬁnite, or a ﬁnite positive value depending on the parameters. When we calibrate the
model to reﬂect actual publicly traded large us corporations, we ﬁnd that the parameters
implied by the calibration lead to a ﬁnite value for optimal disclosure quality. Thus, our
analysis suggests that disclosure requirements going beyond this optimal level are likely to
have unintended consequences and to reduce value.
Section 4 of the paper considers how the ceo could exert eﬀort to distort this signal.3 We
consider three ways in which the ceo could potentially distort the signal. First, ceosc a n
take actions that increase the signal without changing the ﬁrm’s underlying proﬁtability; we
refer to this type of action as “exaggerating eﬀort.” In addition, ceos can take actions that
aﬀect signal noise; we denote such actions as “obscuring eﬀort.” Finally, we brieﬂy consider
the possibility that ceos can conceal information.
We evaluate the implications of penalties and incentives that potentially aﬀect the mo-
tives of ceos to distort the information coming from their ﬁrms. Measures that punish
exaggerating eﬀort can be eﬀective if they are suﬃciently severe to curtail this eﬀort; how-
ever, relatively minor penalties can be counterproductive. In addition, incentives for ceos
to improve the accuracy of information can harm shareholders because such incentives push
a ceo to disclose more than the value-maximizing quantity of information.
We discuss the model’s implications and conclude in Section 5. Proofs not given in the
text can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
The focus of our model is the relationship between the ceo and the ﬁrm’s owners (alterna-
tively, between the ceo and the directors acting on behalf of the owners). The owners seek
to assess the ceo’s ability based on the information available to them, and to replace him
if the assessment is too low. The ceo has career concerns, so he is concerned about infor-
mation transmittal to the broader market. This concern provides him incentives to do what
3Inderst and Mueller (2005), Singh (2004), and Goldman and Slezak (in press) are three other recent
papers concerned with the ceo’s incentives to distort information. Like us, the ﬁrst is concerned with the
board’s making inferences about the ceo’s ability. Inderst and Mueller’s approach diﬀers insofar as they
assume the ceo possesses information not available to the board, which the board needs to induce the ceo
to reveal. There is no uncertainly about the ceo’s ability in Singh’s model; he is focused on the board’s
obtaining accurate signals about the ceo’s actions. Goldman and Slezak are concerned primarily with the
design of stock-based compensation. In addition, unlike us, they treat disclosure rules as exogenous, whereas
we derive the proﬁt-maximizing rules endogenously.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 3
he can to inﬂuence the value and informational properties of the information to which the
owners have access. Exogenous regulatory changes that aﬀect disclosure quality thus aﬀect
both the information available to the owners, and the ceo’s response to the information.
2.1 Timing of the Model
The model has the following timing and features.
Stage 1. The owners of a ﬁrm establish a level of reporting quality, q (its choice may be con-
strained by legal restrictions—e.g., sec requirements). The owners also hire a ceo
from a pool of ex ante identical would-be ceos. Assume the owners make a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer to the ceo.Ag i v e nceo’s ability, α, is an independent random draw
from a normal distribution with mean 0 and known variance 1/τ (τ is the precision
of the distribution). Normalizing the mean of the ability distribution to zero is purely
for convenience and is without loss of generality.
Stage 2.A f t e rt h eceo has been employed for some period, a public signal, s, pertaining to the
ceo’s ability is realized. The signal is distributed normally with a mean equal to α
and a variance equal to 1/q. Letting the precision, q, of the distribution be the same
as the quality of reporting, q, is without loss of generality as we are free to normalize
“reporting quality” using whatever metric we wish.
Stage 3. The owners decide, on the basis of the signal, whether to retain or dismiss the ceo.
Stage 4.T h eceo hired at Stage 1 has his future salary set by competition among potential
employers, where these employers base their valuation of him on the public perception
of his ability.
Stage 5. At the same time as Stage 4, the ﬁrm realizes a payoﬀ that depends on the ability of
the ceo hired at Stage 1 if he was retained at Stage 3. If he was dismissed, then the
owners realize an alternative payoﬀ. Payoﬀs are dispersed immediately to the ﬁrm’s
owners.
The simultaneity of Stages 4 and 5 warrants comment, as an order in which the latter
strictly preceded the former might seem more natural. Our primary reason for assuming the
order we do is to keep the analysis straightforward. If we assumed this alternative order,
then the ceo-labor market might also update its beliefs about the ceo’s ability based on
the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs. This would not, however, change in any substantive way our conclusions,
but would complicate the analysis insofar as we would need to keep track of the updating onHermalin and Weisbach Model 4
both pieces of information (i.e., the signal s and the payoﬀs). In addition, we could justify
this timing if we take “payoﬀs” as shorthand for the long-term ﬁnancial consequences of the
ceo’s management, which may be realized after his tenure with the ﬁrm.
Another aspect of the model that warrants comment up front is our assumption that the
owners both establish a level of reporting quality q and make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the ceo in Stage 1. A common complaint is that shareholders actually lack power vis-` a-vis
the ceo and it is the ceo who both sets the rules and determines his own compensation;
that is, the real world is at odds with our assumptions here. As Hermalin (1992) and others
have observed, however, the issue of initial bargaining power is essentially irrelevant to the
analysis of principal-agent problems. Certainly, the substantive conclusions of this paper
would hold were we to assume that it was the ceo who made a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
the owners of a contract specifying the degree of reporting quality and his compensation.
In particular, as the ceo lowered reporting quality, he would be reducing the shareholders’
well-being ceteris paribus; hence, to keep the shareholders at their participation constraint
(i.e., to keep them willing to sign), he would have to compensate the shareholders by “giving
himself” lower compensation.
Moreover, there are a few reasons to set the bargaining power as we have done. First,
boards of directors (the owners’ representatives) do have clout over the hiring and ﬁring
of the ceo, as well as an ability to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s reporting practices. Hence, it is
not wholly obvious in practice how bargaining power should be assigned and, as noted,
its assignment is not critical for the analysis at hand. Second, if we gave the ceo all the
bargaining power, then the owners would always be up against their participation constraint.
As a consequence, the owners’ equilibrium well-being would be a constant regardless of the
reforms in place. The only consequences of reforms would be to aﬀect the ceo’s well-being.
Since, presumably, a motive for these reforms (e.g., sox) is shareholder beneﬁt, we need to
start from a model in which they are capable of getting beneﬁts; namely one in which all
the surplus from their relation with the ceo is not being captured by the ceo.4
2.2 CEO Preferences and Ability
A ceo’s ability is ﬁxed throughout his career. We follow Holmstrom (1999) by assuming
that the ceo, like all other players, knows only the distribution of his ability. We justify this
assumption by assuming that both the ceo and potential employers learn about his ability
from his actual performance (i.e., no one is born knowing whether he’ll prove to be a good
executive or not) and potential employers can observe this past performance.
4We are unaware of any evidence that sox serves to shift bargaining power from management to share-
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The ceo’s lifetime utility is
u(w1)+u(w2),
where w1 is his salary as set in stage 1 and w2 is his salary as set in stage 4. Observe, for
convenience and without loss of generality, that we ignore intertemporal discounting. Also
observe that we have ruled out deferred or contingent payments from the stage-one employer
to the ceo at Stage 4.5
In our analysis, we assume the ceo is risk averse.6 We assume that u(·)i sa tl e a s t
twice diﬀerentiable and that u(·)i sL2 with respect to any normal distribution (this is
a slightly stronger assumption than simply assuming that expected utility exists—is not
negative inﬁnity—when income is distributed normally).




where ρ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Note the cara utility function satisﬁes the
assumptions given above for the utility function.7 We can consider the case of a risk-neutral
ceo to be the limiting case as ρ ↓ 0.8
The ceo has a reservation utility, uR. That is, his expected utility cannot be less than
uR, otherwise he will not accept the employment contract.
2.3 Updating Beliefs
After the signal, s, is observed, the players update their beliefs about the ceo’s ability. The





  = τ + q, (2)
5Deferred payments could, through wealth eﬀects, change the eﬀective degree of ceo risk aversion, but
would have no substantive implications for the model. Contingent payments could either exacerbate or
reduce the problems stemming from ceo risk aversion depending on how they are structured. Note that
any full insurance in this model would have the perverse property that the ceo is paid more the worse he
performs.
6Alternatively, we could assume the ceo is risk neutral but obtains private beneﬁts of control, the lose of
which is not something for which he can be compensated fully. The results below would carry over to this
alternative model.
7To see the cara utility is L2 observe that E{exp(−2ρw)} =e x p ( −2ρμ+4ρ2σ2) < ∞ if the distribution
is normal, where μ and σ2 are the mean and variance, respectively.
8Take the limit as ρ ↓ 0u s i n gL ’ H ˆ opital’s rule, which yields limρ↓0 u(w)=w.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 6
respectively (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167, for a proof). The posterior distribution of
ability is also normal.
We assumed that the distribution of the signal s given the ceo’s true ability, α, is normal
with mean α and variance 1/q; hence, the distribution of s given the prior estimate of the




to be the precision of s given the prior estimate of ability, 0.10
2.4 The Retention/Dismissal Decision
Suppose that the payoﬀ realized by the ﬁrm in Stage 5 if the ceo was retained at Stage 3 is
R =¯ r + α + ε − w1 , (3)
where ¯ r is a known constant and ε is an ex ante unknown amount distributed normally with
mean 0 and variance σ2
ε.
Assume that the owners are risk neutral. The decision that they make at Stage 3 is
whether to keep the ceo, in which case their payoﬀ will be R as given by expression (3) or
to ﬁre the ceo, in which case their payoﬀ will be
¯ r + αN + ε − w1 − f,
where αN is the ability of the new (replacement) ceo. We assume that the ﬁrm cannot
escape its salary obligation to the initial ceo, hence the −w1 term. The amount, f,w h i c hi s
assumed to be non-negative, reﬂects the costs associated with dismissing the initial ceo (ﬁr-
ing costs). These costs are assumed to represent the cost of disruption plus the compensation
necessary to employ the new ceo for the latter stages of the game.
Because the owners are risk neutral and the unconditional expectation of a ceo’s ability
is zero, the owners make their decision to keep or ﬁre the initial ceo based on a comparison
between what they expect to receive if they keep him,
¯ r +ˆ α − w1 ,
9The random variable s is the sum of two independently distributed normal variables s−α (i.e., the error
in s)a n dα; hence, s is also normally distributed. The means of these two random variables are both zero,
so the mean of s is, thus, 0. The variance of the two variables are 1/q and 1/τ respectively, so the variance
s is 1/q +1 /τ.
10As a convention, functions of many variables, such as H, will be denoted by capital letters.Hermalin and Weisbach Model 7
and what they expect to receive if they dismiss him,
¯ r − w1 − f
(recall E{αN} = 0). The former is less than the latter—that is, they wish to ﬁre the initial
ceo—if and only if ˆ α<−f. Using expression (2), we can restate this dismissal condition





Given this option of change, the ﬁrm’s expected value prior to receiving a signal with
precision q is





































where φ(·) is the density function of a standard normal random variable (i.e., with mean
zero and variance one) and Φ(·) is the corresponding distribution function. The second line
follows from the ﬁrst using the change of variables z ≡ s
√










1 − Φ(Z)=Φ ( −Z)( 5 )
is the probability that the owners will retain the ceo after observing the signal.
Observe that owners prefer higher quality information to lower quality information ceteris
paribus.
Lemma 1 The owners’ expected payoﬀ (V ) is increasing in the level of reporting quality,
all else held equal.
Intuitively, the ability to ﬁre the ceo creates an option. An option that is never exercised
is worthless; hence, if the signal were complete noise, there would be essentially no option.
As the quality of the information improves, the more valuable this option becomes and, thus,
the more valuable the ﬁrm becomes.Hermalin and Weisbach Optimal Reporting Quality 8
2.5 The CEO’s Subsequent Labor Market
We now consider how the ceo’s second-period compensation, w2, is set in Stage 4. We
consider the following structure, which has the feature that career concerns induced by
Stage 4 lead the ceo to prefer lower reporting quality to higher reporting quality ceteris
paribus.
Recall the ceo is risk averse. Assume, too, that the contribution of a ceo of ability α to
a future employer is γα+δ,w h e r eγ>0a n dδ are known constants. Finally, assume future
employers are risk neutral, so that the value they place on the ceo is γˆ α + δ.














Consequently, the ceo’s second-period compensation is normally distributed with mean δ
and variance γ2Var(ˆ α).
As is well known, if two normal distributions have the same mean, but diﬀerent variances,
then the one with the larger variance is a mean-preserving spread of the one with the smaller
variance. It follows therefore that any risk-averse agent will prefer the latter distribution to
the former. For the analysis at hand, this means that the smaller is the variance of w2,t h e
greater is the ceo’s expected utility. This logic leads to the following.
Lemma 2 Consider a risk-averse ceo whose second-period compensation is a positive aﬃne
function of the posterior estimate of his ability. The ceo’s expected utility decreases as the
quality of reporting, q,i n c r e a s e s .










(q + τ)2 > 0.
At ﬁrst glance, Lemma 2 might seem counter-intuitive: wouldn’t a risk-averse ceo prefer
a more precise signal of his ability to a less precise signal? The reason the answer is no is
that the ceo’s future compensation is a function of a weighted average of the prior estimate
of ability (i.e., 0), which is ﬁxed, and the signal, s, which is random. Being risk averse,
the ceo prefers more weight be put on the ﬁxed quantity rather than the random quantity
(remember E{s} =0 ) . T h eless precise the signal, the more weight is put on the prior
estimate, making the ceo better oﬀ.11
11Hermalin (1993) also makes the point that a risk-averse agent would prefer that signals about his abilityHermalin and Weisbach Optimal Reporting Quality 9
3 Optimal Reporting Quality
As demonstrated above, all else equal, the ﬁrm’s owners prefer higher reporting quality to
lower reporting quality, while the ceo prefers lower reporting quality to higher reporting
quality. These opposing preferences become linked through the ceo’s ﬁrst-period compen-
sation, w1: to satisfy the ceo’s participation constraint, an increase in the reporting quality
must be matched with an increase in w1. Because the owners prefer lower ceo compensation
to higher ceo compensation ceteris paribus, it follows that they must, therefore, tradeoﬀ the
beneﬁts of higher reporting quality against the cost incurred through higher ceo compen-
sation. Formally,
Lemma 3 The ﬁrst-period salary, w1, is increasing in the precision of the signal, s; that is,
dw1/dq > 0.
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H/τ. Because dH/dq > 0, Q is monotonically increasing in q and we can thus
optimize (6) with respect to Q to determine the optimal q.
Proposition 1 The optimal quality of information, q, for the ﬁrm to set is inﬁnite if
(i) The ceo is risk neutral; or
(ii) There is no second-period market for the ceo’s services (i.e., γ =0 ).
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be noisier rather than less noisy.Hermalin and Weisbach Optimal Reporting Quality 10
Condition (iii) can be interpreted as saying that a ﬁnite quality of reporting is optimal (proﬁt-
maximizing) if the ceo is suﬃciently risk averse that (a) the magnitude of the negative
correlation between u (γz/
√
τ + δ)a n dγz is big and (b) expected second-period utility is
small. Observe that the greater the importance of the second period market, γ, or the more
diﬀuse the prior beliefs (i.e., the lower is τ), the greater the eﬀective risk aversion of the ceo
and, thus, the more we should expect a ﬁnite level of reporting quality to be optimal.








































   . (8)
Expression (8) allows us to get a sense of whether plausible solutions are interior (i.e., the
optimal q is positive and ﬁnite) by allowing for a rough calibration of the model. Suppose,
for instance, that the standard deviation of ability in terms of ﬁrm proﬁts is $10 million
(i.e., 1/
√
τ = $10 million). Suppose that a ceo captures 20% of his ability and has a “base”
pay of $1 million (i.e., γ =1 /5a n dδ = $1 million). Finally, suppose a ceo’s certainty
equivalence for a gamble in which he wins $10 million if a coin comes up heads but nothing
if it comes up tails is $1 million. These assumptions imply a coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion, ρ, of approximately 6.922 × 10−7. Finally, suppose that if the ceo were to pursue
some alternative employment, then he would earn $500,000 in each of the two periods (i.e.,
uR =2e x p ( −500,000ρ)/ρ). Using these values, the right-hand side of (8) is approximately
3.279; hence, the ﬁrm would optimally choose a ﬁnite level of reporting quality. Indeed,
the optimal q proves to be approximately 1.684 × 10−14; that is, the standard deviation on
reporting quality is $7.71 million.
The above example notwithstanding, we note that there is no guarantee that the maxi-
mization of (6) with respect to q will yield an interior solution. Parameter values exist such
that q →∞is optimal, as do values such that q = 0 is optimal. Nevertheless, we will focus
on those cases for which interior solutions exist.
Proposition 2 If the proﬁt-maximizing level of reporting quality, q, is an interior maxi-
mum, then the following comparative statics hold:
(i) The proﬁt-maximizing level of the quality of reporting, q, is strictly decreasing in the
ﬁring cost, f.Hermalin and Weisbach Optimal Reporting Quality 11
(ii) The proﬁt-maximizing level of the quality of reporting, q, is strictly decreasing in the
sensitivity of future ceo salary to the signal, γ.
(iii) The proﬁt-maximizing level of the quality of reporting, q, is strictly increasing in the
precision of the prior estimate of ceo ability, τ.
Intuitively, an increase in the ﬁring cost lowers the marginal return to reporting quality,
without aﬀecting the marginal cost of reporting quality (i.e., the distribution of w2); hence,
the equilibrium value of reporting quality falls if disruption costs rise (except if the optimal
reporting quality is zero or, possibly, if it is inﬁnite). It can be shown that an increase in
the importance placed on the signal by the ceo in terms of his second-period salary (i.e.,
an increase in γ) raises the marginal cost of reporting quality (i.e., dw1/dq increases in γ),
but leaves the marginal beneﬁt untouched. Consequently, the impact of an increase in γ is
a decrease in the optimal level of reporting quality.
Result (iii) of Proposition 2 might, at ﬁrst, seem less obvious given that an increase in
the precision of the prior estimate of ability reduces the option value of being able to make
a change, which means an increase in q is less valuable. On the other hand, the greater the
precision of the prior estimate, the less weight, relatively speaking, is placed on the signal;
hence, the marginal cost of an increase in reporting quality is also falling. As the proof of
Proposition 2(iii) shows, this second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst and, thus, the overall eﬀect
of an increase in the precision of the prior estimate is to increase the net marginal return to
an increase in reporting quality.
Empirically, Proposition 2(i) suggests that reporting quality will be lower, ceteris paribus,
when the ceo is more entrenched (costly to change). Proposition 2 also suggests that,
ceteris paribus, reporting quality should be better with older (lower γ) or better known
(greater τ) ceos. Note, to the extent that ceos are older or better known because of the
length of service, they may also be more entrenched, thus confounding the eﬀects of age or
familiarity.12 Another confounding factor is that long-serving ceos can develop bargaining
power vis-` a-vis the board and they can use this power to bargain for less intense monitoring
(see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).
Finally, with respect to policy, we have
Corollary 1 If the proﬁt-maximizing level of reporting is ﬁnite, then regulations that force
the ﬁrm to adopt higher reporting levels will reduce expected proﬁts, raise ceo compensation,
and increase the probability of ceo dismissal.
12Although we assume the ceo is hired in Stage 1, it should be clear that nothing relies critically on this
assumption. We could simply think of Stage 1 as the owners entering into a new contract with its incumbent
ceo.Hermalin and Weisbach Efforts by the CEO 12
Proof: The ﬁrst conclusion follows from the nature of optimization.13 The second con-
clusion is simply Lemma 3. The third conclusion follows because, as is readily shown,
∂Φ(Z)/∂q > 0.
4 Eﬀorts by the CEO
So far we have ignored the eﬀorts that the ceo might undertake. In this section, we explore
how the eﬀorts of the ceo could be aﬀected by reporting quality. We consider two kinds
of eﬀort: “exaggerating eﬀort,” denoted by x ∈ R+;a n d“ o bscuring eﬀort,” denoted by
b ∈ R. Exaggerating eﬀort is eﬀort designed to boost the value of the signal s ceteris
paribus. Obscuring eﬀort is eﬀort designed to make the signal s noisier ceteris paribus.A t
the end of this section, we brieﬂy consider how this analysis applies to situations in which
the ceo can conceal signals.
What we seek to capture by exaggerating eﬀort are actions that the ceo might take to
boost the numbers. These include activities such as timing earnings announcements, ag-
gressive accounting, and actually “cooking the books.” Obscuring eﬀort is meant to capture
activities such as aggregating reported data more, substituting into more volatile assets, or
otherwise pursuing riskier strategies. Negative values of b correspond to eﬀorts to reduce
noise, such as providing more detailed information, meeting more frequently with analysts,
and so forth.
We assume that the ceo ﬁnds these eﬀorts costly. Let c(·) denote the cost of eﬀort (we
consider only one kind of eﬀort at a time, so there is no loss in having a common notation
for the cost of eﬀort). For the case of obscuring eﬀort, assume c(·) is a function of |b|.14 In
addition, assume that this cost enters the ceo’s utility function additively, that c(·)i st w i c e
diﬀerentiable on R+, no eﬀort is “free” (i.e., c(0) = 0), there is a positive marginal cost to
eﬀort (i.e., c (·) > 0o n( 0 ,∞)), and this marginal cost is rising in eﬀort (c  (·) > 0). Finally,
assume lima→∞ c (a)=∞.
We assume that the ﬁrm or regulations can impose a “tax” on the ceo for engaging in
these eﬀorts. Speciﬁcally, let r denote the tax rate, so the ceo incurs a cost ra if his eﬀort
is a,w h e r ea denotes x or b as appropriate. There are two interpretations to r:
13To be precise, if there were multiple optimal values of q, then a regulation could simply push the ﬁrm
f r o mal o w - q optimum to a high-q optimum. Multiple optima are not, however, a generic property of this
model.
14There is some lost of generality in assuming the cost of b and −b are the same, but it is minor and
without importance to the results.Hermalin and Weisbach Efforts by the CEO 13
• Through various practices (e.g., reporting requirements, signing certiﬁcates, etc.), the
marginal cost to the ceo of engaging in these eﬀorts is raised by r.
• There is a severe penalty for engaging in these activities, which is applied if these eﬀorts
are detected. The penalty or probability of detection are increasing in the ceo’s eﬀorts,
so ra is the expected penalty.
The ceo’s lifetime utility is, therefore,
u(w1)+u(w2) − ra− c(a), (9)
a = x or = b.
We assume that neither kind of eﬀort has a positive impact on proﬁts. Were this not the
case, then obviously the beneﬁts of restricting the ceo’s eﬀort would be reduced.
Finally, because it adds nothing to the analysis going forward, we will clean up the
notation by henceforth setting δ =0 .
4.1 Exaggerating Eﬀort
Here we consider exaggerating eﬀort. We assume that the signal observed by owners and
outsiders is ˜ s = s + x.
We focus on pure-strategy equilibria. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the ceo doesn’t
fool anyone on the equilibrium path: owners and outsiders infer the x he chooses and use
s =˜ s − ˆ x as the signal, where ˆ x is the value of x that they infer. Given that ˆ x is inferred























ds − C(x,r), (10)
where C(x,r) ≡ rx + c(x). Observe that (10) is globally concave in x; hence, the solution
to (10) is unique.
In equilibrium, the inferred value and the chosen value must be the same. Hence, the
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where xe = 0 if it is an inequality. Lemma A.1 in the Appendix rules out the possibility that
the integral in (11) is inﬁnite. Consequently, because c (x) →∞as x →∞ , it follows that
xe < ∞.
We have the following comparative statics:
Proposition 3 If the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion for the ceo’s utility function is
non-increasing, then
(i) the ceo’s eﬀorts to exaggerate performance are non-decreasing in reporting quality and
strictly increasing if xe > 0;
(ii) the ceo’s eﬀorts to exaggerate performance are non-decreasing in the importance of
his second-period labor market (i.e., γ) and strictly increasing if xe > 0;a n d
(iii) the ceo’s eﬀorts to exaggerate performance are non-increasing in the precision of the
prior estimate of ceo ability (i.e., τ) and strictly decreasing if xe > 0.
Regardless of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion,
(iv) the ceo’s eﬀorts to exaggerate performance are non-increasing in the marginal penalty
(i.e., r) for engaging in these eﬀorts and strictly decreasing if xe > 0.
Moreover, there exists a ﬁnite value r∗, a function of the parameters, such that, if r>r ∗,
the ceo engages in no eﬀorts at exaggeration in equilibrium.
Why attitudes to risk matter can be seen intuitively by considering expression (11). Note
that an increase in γ or Q increase marginal utility for z<0, but decrease marginal utility
for z>0. If this second eﬀect were strong enough than it could dominate the ﬁrst eﬀect
and the direct eﬀect (i.e., the terms preceding u (γSz)) of increasing γ or Q. Assuming
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion to be non-increasing rules out that possibility. It
is a common contention in economics that individuals exhibit non-increasing coeﬃcients of
absolute risk aversion (see, e.g., the discussion in Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992).
Results (i) and (ii) can be read as saying that the more importance the ceo places on
the signal, either because it is receiving greater weight in the determination of his future
salary or because he places greater weight on his future salary, the greater his incentive to
exaggerate and, hence, the more exaggeration that takes place in equilibrium. An increase of
the precision of the prior estimate of ability, τ, reduces the weight placed on the signal with
respect to constructing the posterior estimate, which means the signal has less impact on
the ceo’s future salary. Consequently, an increase in τ reduces his incentives to exaggerate
and, thus, the less exaggeration that takes place in equilibrium.Hermalin and Weisbach Efforts by the CEO 15
Result (iv) is the standard result that increasing the marginal cost of an activity causes
a reduction in the amount of that activity. That there is an r∗ that curtails all exaggeration
follows because the marginal beneﬁt of exaggerating is bounded, while, by increasing r,t h e
marginal cost can be made as large as desired.
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Observe that the ceo’s compensation has increased because he needs to be compensated for
his eﬀorts; that is, unless r ≥ r∗,i nw h i c hc a s ew1 is the same as if there were no opportunity
for the ceo to expend eﬀort (i.e., as in Section 3). This insight yields the following result.
Proposition 4 If there is no constraint on the “tax” rate, r, that can be imposed on the
ceo to discourage eﬀorts at exaggeration and if these eﬀorts have no positive beneﬁts for the
ﬁrm, then it is optimal to set the rate large enough to discourage any exaggeration (i.e., set
r ≥ r∗).
In other words, if the ﬁrm can prevent exaggeration and exaggeration has no beneﬁt, then
it should.
But what if the antecedents of Proposition 4 are not met? In particular, suppose that
there is an upper bound on r,¯ r<r ∗. This could arise because the ability of private parties
to punish each other contractually tend to be limited by the courts (see, e.g., Hermalin et
al., in press, for discussion). Hence, ¯ r could be the eﬀective legal limit. Suppose such a limit
























 (γQz)φ(z)dz , (13)
where the last equality in (13) follows from (11) and comparative statics based on that
expression. As a general rule, expression (13) need not be negative as the following example
illustrates.














Expression (13) is, therefore,
√






which has the same sign as I − 2r. Hence, because I>0, the ceo’s pay is ﬁrst
increasing in r and, then, decreasing in r (changing signs at r = I/2). It follows
that if ¯ r ≤ I/2, then the optimal r for the ﬁrm to set given this constraint is
zero.
As is well known, a punishment that fully deters bad behavior is costless. However, if a
punishment does not fully deter bad behavior, it can be suﬃciently costly to punish partially
that it is better not to punish at all.
If ¯ r is small enough that the ﬁrm cannot prevent distortionary eﬀort and the coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing, then a consequence of the ceo’s being able to
exert eﬀort is that the owners want to reduce the quality of the signal. Observe the owners’




























Given that ∂xe/∂q > 0 from Proposition 3 and, thus, ∂xe/∂S > 0, it follows that the optimal
Q (i.e., q) when the is less than when the ceo cannot expend eﬀort (i.e., when x ≡ 0). We
can, therefore, conclude:
Proposition 5 If the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion for the ceo’s utility function is
non-increasing and it is impossible to block the ceo from exaggerating performance, then the
optimal reporting quality is less than if the ceo were incapable of exaggerating performance
(i.e., if it were possible to set r ≥ r∗).
4.2 Obscuring Eﬀort
Now we turn to obscuring eﬀort. Let the precision of the signal be (1−b)q,w h e r eb is eﬀorts




We again focus on pure-strategy equilibria. In such an equilibrium, owners and outsiders
must correctly infer the b chosen by the ceo.L e tˆ b denote the value they infer. Deﬁne
H(b)=
(1 − b)qτ
(1 − b)q + τ
.Hermalin and Weisbach Efforts by the CEO 17
Observe H (b) < 0.































φ(z)dz − c(|b|) − rb. (14)
Observe the integral in (14)—the ceo’s beneﬁt of obscuring the signal—is decreasing in b.15
This might, at ﬁrst, seem counter-intuitive in light of Lemma 2, which proved that a risk-
averse ceo prefers a noisier signal to a less noisy signal. The diﬀerence is that in Lemma 2
everyone knew how noisy the signal is. Here, everyone (but the ceo) merely infers how
noisy the signal is. What we’ve shown, then, is given that they are updating using their
inferred precision, the ceo actually has an incentive to reduce the noise in the signal.






















sign(b) − r =0. (15)
Observe that the left-hand side of (15) is negative for b>0. This establishes the following.
Proposition 6 When the ceo can take actions, which are not observable to others, that
make the signal noisier or less noisy and there is a non-zero penalty for making the signal
noisier (i.e., r ≥ 0), then the ceo takes actions to reduce the noisiness of the signal in
equilibrium.
Although the owners beneﬁt from a less noisy signal (Lemma 1), they could always have
chosen the equilibrium level of precision (i.e., (1−be)q) themselves for free. If they did so and
could somehow prevent the ceo from choosing a b  = 0, then this would be welfare-improving










where the value of A>0 is obvious. The integral is the covariance of u (Az)a n dz. Because u (Az)i s
decreasing in z, due to diminishing marginal utility, this covariance is negative; that is, the above expression
is positive. Given that H (b) < 0, it follows that the integral in (14) is decreasing in b.Hermalin and Weisbach Efforts by the CEO 18
relative to a regime in which they choose q and the ceo chooses and incurs the cost of be.
Hence, all else equal, the owners are better oﬀ the fewer incentives the ceo has to set b<0.
With respect to policy, we have, therefore, the following.
Corollary 2 Any regulations or measures that encourage the ceo to take actions that im-
prove the quality of information relative to what the owners would wish to stipulate are
welfare (proﬁt) reducing.
4.3 Concealing Information
In light of some recent corporate scandals, one concern is not that executives distort in-
formation, but rather that they conceal it. In this subsection, we brieﬂy address what our
analysis can say with respect to concealing information.
One question is whether the other players know if the ceo has concealed information? If
so, then presumably they can punish the ceo for non-disclosure. Moreover, if it is common
knowledge that the ceo knows the value of signals that he conceals, then an unraveling
argument (Grossman, 1981) applies: Whatever the inferred expected value of unrevealed
signals is, the ceo will have an incentive to reveal those above that expected value. Hence,
the only equilibrium is one in which unrevealed signals are inferred to have the lowest possible
value and the ceo is correspondingly induced to reveal all signals. We predict therefore that
concealment is unlikely to be an issue if the other players know what the set of signals is.16
Suppose, in contrast, that the other players did not know what the complete set of
signals was (e.g., the set varies over time). If the ceo did not know the realized value when
he deciding to reveal or conceal a signal, then he would wish to conceal all signals that
he could: more signals means a more precise posterior estimate of his ability, which means
greater career risk for him. Our model, thus, predicts that when (i) the ceo has discretion
over what signals are revealed and (ii) must commit to reveal or conceal prior to learning
the value of the signals, he will choose to commit to conceal all signals over which he has
discretion.
If, instead, the ceo is not committed to a disclosure decision prior to learning the value
of the signals, then he will be tempted to reveal those that are favorable to him. The
other players will infer that they are getting a biased sample and, thus, make a downward
16One way the ﬁrm can set the proﬁt-maximizing level of transparency would be to determine ex ante
which signals will be released and which concealed. Of course, there must be commitment to this set ex
ante, because otherwise, ex post,t h eceo would be tempted to reveal those to-be-concealed signals if they
reﬂected favorably upon him; but knowing this temptation exists, the unraveling argument would result in
full revelation and, hence, more than the proﬁt-maximizing level of transparency. We also note that if the
set of possible signals is unknown, then regulation is diﬃcult if not impossible.Hermalin and Weisbach Discussion and Conclusion 19
adjustment. In this sense, the situation is similar to that of “exaggerating eﬀort.” The
details of the analysis are, to be sure, diﬀerent and await future analysis, but our general
conclusions will generally hold.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Most corporate governance reforms involve increased transparency. Yet, discussions of dis-
closure generally focus on issues other than governance, such as the cost of capital and
product-market competition. The logic of how transparency potentially aﬀects governance
is absent from the academic literature.
We provide such analysis in this paper. We show that the level of transparency can
be understood as deriving from the governance relation between the ceo and the board of
directors. The directors set the level of transparency (e.g., amount and quality of disclosure)
and it is, thus, part of an endogenously chosen governance arrangement.17
Increasing transparency provides beneﬁts to the ﬁrm, but entails costs as well. Better
transparency improves the board’s monitoring of the CEO by providing it with an improved
signal about his quality. But better transparency is not free: The better able the market is
to learn about the ceo’s ability, the greater the risk to which the ceo is exposed. In our
setting, the proﬁt-maximizing level of transparency requires balancing these two factors.
Our model implies that there can be an optimal level of transparency. Consequently,
attempts to mandate levels beyond this optimum decrease proﬁts. Proﬁts decrease both
because managers will have to be paid higher salaries to compensate them for the increased
career risk they face, and because greater transparency increases managerial incentives to
engage in costly and counterproductive eﬀorts to distort information. We emphasize that
these eﬀects occur in a model in which all other things equal, better information disclosure
increases ﬁrm value.
One key assumption we make throughout the paper is that the board relies on the same
information that is released to the public in making its monitoring decisions. Undoubtedly,
this assumption is literally false in most ﬁrms, as the board has access to better information
than the public. Nonetheless, ceos do have incentives to manipulate information transfers
to improve the board’s perception of them, and this idea has been an important factor
in a number of recent studies (see, e.g., Adams and Ferriera, in press). In addition, in a
number of publicized cases, boards have been kept in the dark except through their ability
to access publicly disclosed documents; the circumstances in which boards must rely on
17We could have alternatively allowed for the level of transparency to be set through a bargaining process
in which the ceo has bargaining power. Our substantive results are robust to such a change.Hermalin and Weisbach Discussion and Conclusion 20
publicly available information are likely the cases in which the board-ceo relationship is
most adversarial, and hence are the cases in which board monitoring is likely most important.
Certainly, our basic assumption that the quality of public disclosure has a large impact on
the board’s ability to monitor management is plausible.
Our model is set in the context of a board that is perfectly aligned with shareholders’
interests. One could equally well apply it to direct monitoring by shareholders. If there
were an increase in the quality of available information either due to more stringent report-
ing requirements or because of better analysis (e.g., of the sort performed by institutional
investors or a more attentive press), then our model contains clear empirical predictions. In
particular, it suggests that consequences of improved information would be increases in ceo
salaries and the rate of ceo turnover. In fact, both ceo salaries and ceo turnover have
increased substantially starting in the 1990s, with at least some scholars’ attributing the
increase to the higher level of press scrutiny and investor activism (see Kaplan and Minton,
2006). This pattern of ceo salaries and turnover is consistent with our model; moreover, it
is consistent with the idea that better information has both costs and beneﬁts through its
impact on corporate governance.
Some issues remain. As discussed above, we have only scratched the surface with respect
to issues of managerial concealment of information. We have abstracted away from any of
the concerns about revealing information to rivals or regulators that earlier work has raised.
We have also ignored other competing demands for better information, such as to help
better resolve the principal-agent problem through incentive contracts (see e.g., Grossman
and Hart, 1983, Singh, 2004). Finally, we have ignored the mechanics of how the ﬁrm
actually makes information more or less informative (e.g., what accounting rules are used,
what organizational structures, such as reporting lines and oﬃce organization, are employed,
etc.). While future attention to such details will, we believe, shed additional light on the
subject, we remain conﬁdent that our general results will continue to hold.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 21
Appendix A: Technical Details and Proofs
Lemma A.1 Given that u(·) is L2 for any normal distribution, it follows that u (·) is L for
any normal distribution; that is, that E{u (z)} exists (is ﬁnite) if z is distributed normally.
























































The ﬁrst integral is ﬁnite because u(·) is such that expected utility exists for all normal
distributions. The second integral is the expectation of the product of two L2 functions with
respect to normal distributions, u(ζ)a n dζ(ζ−λμ), and thus it is also integrable with respect
to a normal distribution (see, e.g., Theorem 10.35 of Rudin, 1964). Since both integrals are
ﬁnite, their sum is ﬁnite. Hence, dE{u(λz)}/dλ is everywhere deﬁned, including at λ =1 .










































(q + τ)2 > 0, (16)Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 22
where the second fraction in the last line is ∂H/∂q > 0.






Because the owners make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and their well-being is decreasing in w1,
the constraint above must bind. From Lemma 2, an increase in q lowers the ceo’s expected
second-period utility, so his ﬁrst-period utility must increase to maintain equality. Hence w1
is increasing in q.








Hence, (6) is increasing everywhere in q by Lemma 1. The optimal q is, thus, inﬁnite.
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Q2 φ(−f/Q) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows because f ≥ 0. It follows, therefore, if the optimal q is ﬁnite,
then the optimal q is non-increasing in f. Hence, if the optimal q is ﬁnite when f = 0 it is
ﬁnite for all f. Observe that limq→∞ Q =1 /
√
τ. Hence, the optimal q is ﬁnite if
0 >D (1/
√
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But this is just condition (iii). The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider conclusion (i). It was shown in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 that dq/df ≤ 0. The result follows
Consider conclusion (ii). The marginal beneﬁt of Q is unaﬀected by a change in γ.T h e
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where w2(z) ≡ γQz + δ. The expression is positive because
① u(·)i sc o n c a v e ,s ou−1(·)i sc o n v e x .
② Given u(·)i sc o n c a v e ,u  
w2(z)
 








③ Same covariance argument as ②.
④ Because marginal utility is positive, inverse utility is increasing.
⑤ u  (·) < 0a n dz2 > 0, so expectation of this term must be negative.
⑥ Same covariance argument as ②.
Hence, because the marginal cost of Q (equivalently, q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nγ, the result follows.





2H3/2(q + τ)3 < 0. (17)
As noted earlier, ∂Q/∂q > 0. Hence, to restore Q to its optimal value, the response to an
increase in τ must be an increase in q;t h a ti s ,dq/dτ > 0 (unless q = ∞).
18Recall that E{z} =0 ,s oE{zf(z)} is the covariance of z and f(z).Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 24
Proof of Proposition 3: Let R(·) denote the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (note
R(·)=ρ if utility is cara). By the usual comparative statics arguments and the fact that




















Except if Q =0( i nw h i c hc a s exe = 0 and thus non-decreasing), this derivative has the same
sign as   ∞
−∞
2u




 (γQz)φ(z)dz > 0. (18)
Because u (·) > 0, the ﬁrst integral is positive. The second integral is the covariance between
R(γQz)u (γQz)a n dz).19 The function R(γQz)u (γQz) is a non-increasing function of z,
hence its covariance with z is non-positive. Consequently, the sign of the left-hand side
expression in (18) is positive.
Similar calculations reveal that the derivative of (11) with respect to γ has the same sign
as   ∞
−∞
u










































Given that ∂Q/∂τ < 0 (recall (17)), the same arguments used above imply this expression
is negative provided q>0, which it must be if xe > 0. Hence (iii) follows.
Turning to result (iv), clearly the derivative of (11) is negative with respect to r.
19See footnote 18 for details.Hermalin and Weisbach Appendix 25








Then, if r>r ∗, (11) is negative for all x ≥ 0, hence xe =0i fr>r ∗.
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